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Abstract
The ever-increasing computational demand of Deep Learning has propelled re-
search in special-purpose inference accelerators based on emerging non-volatile
memory (NVM) technologies. Such NVM crossbars promise fast and energy-
efficient in-situ matrix vector multiplications (MVM) thus alleviating the long-
standing von Neuman bottleneck in today’s digital hardware. However the analog
nature of computing in these NVM crossbars introduces approximations in the
MVM operations. In this paper, we study the impact of these non-idealities on
the performance of DNNs under adversarial attacks. The non-ideal behavior inter-
feres with the computation of the exact gradient of the model, which is required
for adversarial image generation. In a non-adaptive attack, where the attacker is
unaware of the analog hardware, we show that analog computing offers a varying
degree of intrinsic robustness, with a peak adversarial accuracy improvement of
35.34%, 22.69%, and 31.70% for white box PGD (=1/255, iter=30) for CIFAR-10,
CIFAR-100, and ImageNet(top-5) respectively. We also demonstrate "hardware-in-
loop" adaptive attacks that circumvent this robustness by utilizing the knowledge
of the NVM model. To our knowledge, this is the first work that explores the
non-idealities of analog computing for adversarial robustness.
1 Introduction
Deep Learning [23] is a popular, versatile machine learning methodology that has been applied to a
wide range of optimization tasks, such as computer vision [31], natural language processing [36],
recommender systems [10], etc. Many consumer applications rely on deep neural networks (DNNs)
to enhance their user experience, such as smart wearables, smart assistants, etc. As our reliance on
deep learning increases, so does the need to build secure, reliable, efficient frameworks for executing
the intensive computational requirements of DNNs.
To accommodate the growing computational needs of DNNs special-purpose accelerators such as
GoogleTPU [20], Microsoft BrainWave [11], and NVIDIA V100 [1] have been proposed. These
systems operate on the principle of efficiently performing matrix-vector multiplication (MVM)
operations, the key computational kernel in DNNs, by co-locating memory and processing elements.
Despite their success, the saturating scaling trends of digital CMOS [35] has garnered interest in
non-volatile memory (NVM) technologies such as RRAM [32], PCRAM [33] and Spintronics [14].
The memory element in these technologies can be arranged in a crossbar fashion to enable efficient
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MVM computations in the analog domain inside the memory array. Such an in-memory computing
primitive can significantly lower power and latency compared to digital CMOS [29]. Promises offered
by the NVM crossbars have propelled significant research in designing analog computing based
accelerators, such as PUMA [3].
In an analog computing hardware the output of an MVM operation is sensed as a summation of
currents through resistive NVM devices arranged in a crossbar, and hence are prone to errors due to
non-ideal behavior of the crossbar and its peripheral circuits. Such errors are hard to model due to the
interdependence of multiple analog variables (voltages, currents, resistances) in the crossbar. These
deviations result in overall performance degradation of the DNN implementation [8]. Several works
have explored various techniques to counteract the impact of these non-idealities [24, 9].
On the flip side, even though the changes in DNN activations arising from non-idealities is hard to
model, it can potentially lead to adversarially robust DNN implementations. Adversarial images are
generated by estimating the gradients of the model with respect to its input, and carefully perturbing
the images in the direction of maximum change in the classifier output [30, 15]. To counter such
attacks, several techniques that rely on gradient obfuscation have been previously proposed [13, 5, 4].
In this work, we explore how non-ideal NVM crossbars have a similar intrinsic effect to gradient
obfuscation. We implement DNNs on the PUMA architecture, which is composed of thousands of
MVM units (MVMUs) made of NVM crossbars. The aformentioned errors occur at the output of
these internal MVMUs, which are practically inaccessible to a third party user, such as the software
designer or even an attacker. Moreover, the nature of the errors depends heavily on the technology,
which might not be fully disclosed by the manufacturer. Finally, any scaled technology is prone to
chip to chip variations [26] which can further deter an attacker from exactly replicating the DNN
activations. We study two distinct scenarios, one where the attacker does not have access to custom
NVM hardware and generates attacks based on accurate digital hardware, and the other where the
attacker generates attacks with the NVM hardware in loop.
The main contributions of this work are as follows:
• We demonstrate that adversarial attacks crafted without the knowledge of the hardware
implementation are less effective in both black box and white box scenarios.
• We tested multiple variants of NVM crossbars, and show that the degree of intrinsic robust-
ness offered by the analog hardware is in proportion to its degree of non-ideal behavior.
• We show that “Hardware-in-Loop” adaptive adversarial attacks are more effective, as the
attacker can now account for the non-ideal computations when crafting the adversarial
examples. We show that the degree of success depends on what hardware is available to the
attacker and how similar it is to the target model’s hardware.
2 Background and Related Work
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Figure 1: (Left) Illustration of NVM crossbar which produces output current Ij , as a dot-product
of voltage vector, Vi and NVM device conductance, Gij . (Right) Various peripheral and parasitic
resistances modify the dot-product computations into an interdependent function of the analog
variables (voltage, conductance and resistances) in a non-ideal NVM crossbar.
2
2.1 In-memory Analog Computing Hardware
In-memory analog computing with NVM technologies are being extensively studied for machine
learning (ML) workloads [6, 2, 7] because of their inherent ability to perform efficient matrix-
vector multiplications, the key computational kernel in DNNs. The basic compute fabric in NVM
technologies is a two-dimensional cross-point memory, known as a crossbar, shown in Fig. 1. The
memory devices lie at the intersection of horizontally (source-line) and vertically (bit-line) running
metal lines. The conductance of each memory device can be programmed to a discrete number of
levels [19]. By simultaneously applying inputs, in the form of voltages, Vi, at the source-lines, the
multiplications are performed between the voltages, Vi and conductances, Gij , by each NVM device
using the principle of Ohm’s law. Finally, the product, which is the resulting current, Iij , from each
NVM device, is summed up using Kirchoff’s current law to produce a dot-product output, Ij at each
column:
Ij =
∑
i
Iij =
∑
i
ViGij (1)
Such parallelized dot-products across all columns enable efficient multiplication of the input voltage
vector, V , and the crossbar conductance matrix, G, resulting in an output vector, I = V G. A few key
aspects of the design of NVM crossbars are the following parameters:
• Crossbar Size: The number of rows and columns in the crossbar matrix.
• ON Resistance (RON ): The minimum resistance level of the NVM device.
Typically, in a convolutional neural network (CNN), the convolution operation between the input
and the weight tensor can be represented in the form of a series of MVM operations, which can be
subdivided into smaller MVM operations to conform to the technological restrictions of the size of
the NVM crossbar. Floating point inputs and weights in DNNs are converted to fixed point precision
to make them compatible with NVM crossbar based computations.
The analog nature of computing in NVM crossbars introduces functional errors in the MVM com-
putations due to several non-idealities arising from the NVM devices and peripheral resistances.
The aforementioned crossbar design parameters, such as Crossbar Size, and ON Resistance have
varying impact on the degree of functional errors introduced by the non-idealities [8] by affecting the
effective resistance of a crossbar column. Larger crossbar size lowers the effective resistance, making
the crossbar more prone to non-ideal effects, while higher ON resistance increases it, resulting in a
crossbar less affected by non-idealities.
Due to the non-idealities, the resulting output current, Ini is a function of volatge vector V , conduc-
tance matrix G(V ), which is now dependent on V , and several non-ideal factors:
Ini = f(V,G(V ), Rsource, Rsink, Rwire) (2)
To study the impact of such non-ideal behavior of NVM crossbars on DNNs, researchers have
previously proposed techniques to model the non-ideal function in Equation 2. One such technique is
GENIEx [8] where the authors use a neural network to model the aforementioned non-ideal function.
DNNs typically consist of thousands of MVM operations at every layer. The NVM crossbar non-
idealities cause the activations at every layer to deviate from their expected value, and this deviation
propagates through the network. This results in a degradation of DNN accuracy at inference (without
any adversary). Interestingly, the same deviation in activation imparts adversarial robustness when
under attack, which is further analyzed in this paper.
2.2 Adversarial Attacks
In 2013, the authors of [30] demonstrated that a classifier can be forced to make an error by adding
small perturbations to the data which are almost imperceptible to the human eye. They coined the
term "adversarial examples" to define such data designed specifically to fool the classifier. Since then,
several methods have been developed to generate such data, which are known as "adversarial attacks".
In principle, these attacks try to solve the following optimization problem [27]:
x∗ = x+ argmin{z : F (x+ z) 6= F (θ, x)} = x+ δx (3)
where x is the original data, x∗ is the perturbed adversarial data, F (x) is the classifier function,
mapping inputs to labels, and the objective of the adversary is to misclassify, i.e. F (x∗) 6= F (x).
Most attacks use gradient-based optimization to solve for eq.3, and the attack’s success relies on how
accurately one can estimate∇xL(θ, x, y), the derivative of the cost function (L(θ, x, y)) with respect
to x, where θ is the target model parameters, and the inputs and labels are x and y respectively [15].
3
3 Adversarial Robustness of NVM Crossbar based Analog Computing
In recent years, several adversarial defenses have been proposed that disrupt the gradient computation
of the model by adding an extra computational element to the network, such as a randomization layer
at the beginning [34], or adaptive dropout after every layer [13]. When a DNN model is implemented
on an NVM crossbar architecture, the non-idealities have a similar effect of changing the layer-wise
activations of the DNNs. There is no simple differentiable function to model these deviations, and
one cannot determine them without probing the analog hardware. Thus, such an implementation,
could potentially increase the robustness of the neural network. In this section we describe the
methodology to emulate DNNs on the PUMA architecture, and set up different threat models based
on the attacker’s knowledge of both the software and the hardware.
3.1 Crossbar Models
Table 1: Crossbar Model Description
Crossbar parameters
Crossbar Model Size RON (Ω) NF
64×64_300k 64×64 300k 0.07
32×32_100k 32×32 100k 0.14
64×64_100k 64×64 100k 0.26
To model the non-ideal crossbar, we use GENIEx, a deep learning based crossbar model developed
by the authors of [8]. They define a multi-layer perceptron (MLP) which receives V and G as inputs
and predicts the output Ini. This MLP is trained on training pairs [(V ,G), Ini] obtained from circuit
simulations. In this paper, we have replicated the modeling technique of GENIEx to generate 3
RRAM based crossbar models (Table 1).
The degree of non-ideality has been described by the authors of GENIEx as Non-ideality Factor
(NF ) = (Expected output-Actual Output)/Expected Output. NF is directly (inversely) proportional
to crossbar size (ON Resistance). In our experiments, we have considered different crossbar models
to study the impact of different degrees of non-idealities, represented by different NF , on adversarial
robustness, as shown in Table 1.
To integrate the NVM crossbar models with the PyTorch framework, we have adopted a functional
simulator from [8] based on PUMA hardware architecture [3].
3.2 Datasets and Network Models
For our evaluation we selected 3 image recognition tasks, and trained a ResNet [18] for each task.
• CIFAR-10 [21]: A ResNet-20 was trained for 200 epochs, with the learning rate (lr)
schedule [0.1(1, 79), 0.01(80, 119), 0.001(120, 200)] and achieved test accuracy of 92.44%
• CIFAR-100 [21]: A ResNet-32 was trained for 200 epochs, with the lr schedule
[0.1(1, 79), 0.01(80, 119), 0.001(120, 200)], and achieved test accuracy of 71.42%
• ImageNet [12]: A ResNet-18 was trained for 90 epochs, with the lr schedule
[0.1(1, 29), 0.01(30, 59), 0.001(60, 90)], and acheived top-1 and top-5 test accuracy of
69.83% and 89.19% respectively.
3.3 Generating Adversarial attacks
Table 2: Attacker’s Knowledge for the Threat Scenarios
Accurate Digital Computation Non-Ideal Analog Computation
Attack Type Model Weights Logits Activations Crossbar Model Logits Activations
Non-Adaptive Attacks
Transfer Attacks No No No No No No
Black Box Attacks No Yes No No No No
White Box Attacks Yes Yes Yes No No No
Adaptive Attacks
Black Box Attacks No N/A N/A Yes (may not match) Yes No
White Box Attacks Yes N/A N/A Yes (may not match) Yes Yes
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We define 5 different threat scenarios with varying extent of the attacker’s knowledge of the target
model and the underlying hardware (Table 2). For each threat scenario there is an attack model (a
single DNN or an ensemble of DNNs) which is used to generate the adversarial images. We use
Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) [25] to generate iterative perturbations that are bound by the l∞
norm, as shown in Eq.4:
xt+1 = Πx+S(x
t + αsgn(∇xL(θ, xt, y)) (4)
xt+1 is the adversarial example generated at (t + 1)th iteration. The model’s cost function is
L(θ, x, y), which is a function of the model parameters θ, input x, and labels y. The set of allowed
perturbations is given by S. For the l∞ norm, the attack epsilon () defines the set of perturbations as
S =
(
δ|(x+ δ ≥ max(x+ , 0)) ∧ (x+ δ ≤ min(x+ , 1))), where x ∈ [0, 1].
3.3.1 Non-Adaptive Attacks
Our first category of threat scenario is "Non-Adaptive Attacks", i.e. the attacker has no knowledge
of the underlying analog hardware and the attacks are generated under the assumption of accurate
digital computation. Under this category, we have 3 varying degrees of attack.
Transfer Attacks This is the weakest threat model where the adversary has no knowledge of
the model. The attack model is another DNN trained on the same dataset and run on an accurate
digital hardware. The attack model architectures for CIFAR-10/100, and Imagenet are ResNet-10,
ResNet-20, and AlexNet [22], respectively. ResNet-10 and ResNet-20 are trained on CIFAR-10/100,
respectively, using the same training schedule as the target models. For Imagenet, we used a pretrained
AlexNet available in Pytorch [28].
Black Box Attacks The attacker queries the model on an accurate digital hardware and reads the
output of the final layer before softmax (logits) to generate a synthetic dataset of training data and
its corresponding logits. This synthetic dataset is used to train 3 different ResNet models, ResNet-
10,20,32, which are used to generate adversarial images using the stack parallel ensemble strategy
[17].
White Box Attacks This is the highest threat level where the attacker has full knowledge of the
model weight, thus the attack model is the same as the target model. However, while generating
gradients, the attacker has no knowledge of the underlying analog hardware implementation. The
gradients for the attack are computed assuming accurate digital hardware implementation.
Comparison with Related Work We have selected 3 defenses that can be applied to a pretrained
network as listed below. For a fair comparison, we apply non-adaptive attacks for these defenses
as well, i.e. the defenses are not visible to the attacker when they query the model to generate their
synthetic dataset for Black Box attacks, and when they generate gradients for White Box attacks.
• Input Bit Width (BW) Reduction [16]: The input is quantized to 4-bits.
• Stochastic Activation Pruning (SAP) [13] (for CIFAR-10/100 only): At inference, after
every convolution layer, there is an adaptive dropout, that randomly sets the layer outputs to
0 with a probability proportional to their absolute value.
• Random Padding [34] (for ImageNet only): Two randomization layers are introduced
before the pretrained model. The first layer scales the input image to a random size NxN
where N ∈ [299, 331] using nearest-neighbor extrapolation. The second layer randomly
pads the image to generate the final image of size 331x331.
3.3.2 Hardware in Loop Adaptive Attacks
In this category of attacks, the attacker is aware that the model is implemented on an NVM crossbar
hardware. However, the crossbar model available to the attacker may or may not match with the
target’s implementation. For crafting Black Box Attacks, the attacker queries the DNN model
implemented on the NVM crossbar based hardware to create the synthetic dataset. In the case of
White Box attacks, the attacker generates adversarial images using "Hardware-in-Loop" gradient
descent. Note that the NVM crossbar based hardware is designed for inference tasks and does not
support backpropagation of gradients. Thus, for "Hardware-in-Loop", the forward pass is performed
on NVM crossbar hardware, and all activations are recorded. However, the derivatives are calculated
assuming ideal computations in place of non-ideal MVM operations of the crossbar. As described
in Section 3.1, the NVM crossbar non-idealities vary with crossbar properties. We use 3 different
crossbar models as defined in Table 1 and we explore scenarios where there is a mismatch in the
crossbar model used by the attacker and the target implementation.
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4 Results
The first effect of implementing DNNs on a NVM crossbar hardware is the reduction in clean accuracy
due to the errors associated with non-ideal computations. Greater the Non-Ideality Factor (NF), more
severe is the accuracy degradation as noted in Table 3 and 4. The clean accuracy of CIFAR-10 drops
from 92.44% (accurate digital hardware) to 88.34% on 64x64_100k, the most non-ideal crossbar
model among the three chosen. Similarly, CIFAR-100 accuracy drops from 71.42% to 55.48% and
ImageNet accuracy falls from 69.56% to 62.50% on the 64x64_100k NVM crossbar hardware. If
non-idealities of NVM hardware had no impact on adversarial robustness, similar degradation would
have been observed in model accuracy under attack. However, our findings, as outlined below,
indicate a different trend.
4.1 Non-Adaptive Attacks
(a) (b) (c)
Figure 2: Non-Adaptive Transfer Attacks (PGD, iter=30) on CIFAR-10/100 and ImageNet on 3 NVM
models and 3 defenses, Input BW Reduction (4-bit input) [16], SAP [13], Random Pad [34]
Transfer Attacks In Fig. 2, we observe the decline in adversarial accuracy with increasing attack
epsilon () for CIFAR-10, CIFAR-100, and Imagenet. For CIFAR-10/100, the 64x64_300k model
did not exhibit any increase in robustness, instead it trailed behind the baseline accuracy. In case
of CIFAR-10, the other two crossbar models, 32x32_100k and 64x64_100k, displayed an absolute
increase in robustness of 4.2% and 5.9% averaged over  = (2,4,6,8)/255, respectively. For CIFAR-
100, the average increase in robustness for  = (4,6,8)/255 was 1.4% for 32x32_100k and 1.84%
for 64x64_100k. The peak improvement in robustness was observed for  = 6/255 and has been
summarized in Table 3. For ImageNet, we do not observe any improvement in robustness. A possible
reason could be that the attack is much weaker, as it was generated on a different architecture
(AlexNet), instead of a ResNet. The more generic the attack, the less effect the NVM non-idealities
seem to have on robustness.
(a) (b)
Figure 3: Non-Adaptive Black Box Attacks (PGD, iter=30) on CIFAR-10, CIFAR-100 on 3 NVM
crossbar models and the 2 defenses, Input BW Reduction (4-bit input) [16] and SAP [13]
Black Box Attacks From Fig. 5, we observe similar trends as transfer attacks for CIFAR-10, and
CIFAR-100. The 64x64_300k model didn’t exhibit any increase in robustness, instead it trailed
behind the baseline accuracy. The NVM crossbar models, 32x32_100k and 64x64_100k, recorded
an absolute increase in robustness of 5.3% and 7.8% averaged over  = (2,4,6,8)/255, respectively
for CIFAR-10. For CIFAR-100, it was 1.4% and 1.84% respectively. The peak improvement in
robustness was observed for  = 4/255 and has been summarized in Table 3.
White Box Attacks Under this threat model we observe the highest improvement in robustness
as depicted in Fig. 4 for CIFAR-10/100 and Table 4 for ImageNet. The NVM model 64x64_300k
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(a) (b)
Figure 4: Non-Adaptive White Box Attacks (PGD, iter=30) on CIFAR-10, CIFAR-100 on 3 NVM
models and 2 defenses, Input BW Reduction (4-bit input) [16] and SAP [13]
Table 3: CIFAR-10/100 accuracy against Non-Adaptive Attacks (PGD, iter=30)
NVM Crossbar Models (Target)
Attack Type Baseline 64×64_300k 32×32_100k 64×64_100k 4-bit input [16] SAP [13]
CIFAR-10 (ResNet-20)
Clean 92.44 90.35 (-2.09) 90.42 (+2.02) 88.34 (-4.10) 89.84 (-2.60) 79.76 (-12.68)
Transfer Attack (ResNet-10)  = 6/255 12.94 12.24 (-0.70) 18.53 (+5.59) 21.54 (+8.6) 22.43 (+9.49) 30.48 (+17.54)
Ensemble Black Box Attack  = 4/255 18.91 17.15 (-1.76) 26.6 (+7.69) 30.35 (+11.44) 31.89 (+12.98) 40.19 (+21.28)
White Box Attack =1/255 19.64 17.56 (-2.08) 46.12 (+26.48) 54.98 (+35.34) 55.29 (+35.65) 64.26 (+44.62)
White Box Attack =2/255 0.51 0.45 (-0.06) 8.51 (+8.00) 17.22 (+16.71) 14.94 (+14.34) 44.85 (+44.34)
CIFAR-100 (ResNet-32)
Clean 71.42 63.89 (-7.53) 62.44 (-8.98) 55.48 (-15.94) 64.20 (-7.22) 44.41 (-27.01)
Transfer Attack (ResNet-20) =6/255 9.61 8.45 (-1.16) 11.14 (+1.53) 11.83 (+2.22) 14.88 (+5.27) 15.76 (+6.15)
Ensemble Black Box Attack =4/255 9.88 8.03 (-1.85) 11.95 (+2.07) 12.59 (+2.71) 17.07 (+7.19) 17.60 (+7.72)
White Box Attack =1/255 5.78 6.53 (+0.75) 24.22 (+18.44) 28.47 (+22.69) 30.45 (+24.67) 32.4 (+26.62)
White Box Attack =2/255 0.24 0.39 (+0.15) 4.55 (+4.31) 8.27 (+8.03) 8.94 (+8.70) 20.14 (+19.9)
Table 4: ImageNet Accuracy against Non-Adaptive White Box Attacks (PGD, iter = 30)
NVM Crossbar Models (Target)
Attack Type Baseline 64×64_300k 32×32_100k 64×64_100k 4 bit input [16] Random Pad [34]
Top-1 Accuracy
Clean 69.56 65.2 (-4.36) 64.9 (-4.66) 62.5 (-7.06) 67.1 (-2.46) 65.1 (-4.46)
White Box Attack =1/255 0.40 0.60 (+0.20) 4.50 (+4.10) 10.30 (+9.90) 9.6 (+9.20) 44.3 (+43.90)
White Box Attack =2/255 0.10 0.10 (+0.00) 0.20 (+0.10) 0.50 (+0.40) 0.10 (+0.00) 33.50 (+33.40)
Top-5 Accuracy
Clean 89.06 86.3 (-2.76) 86.2 (-2.86) 84.8 (-4.26) 86.5 (-2.56) 85.9 (-3.16)
White Box Attack =1/255 18.60 19.30 (+0.70) 42.20 (+23.60) 50.30 (+31.70) 52.00 (+33.40) 73.2 (+54.60)
White Box Attack =2/255 4.10 3.70 (-0.40) 13.40 (+9.30) 19.30 (+15.20) 20.60 (+16.50) 64.10 (+60.00)
still continues to closely follow baseline accuracy. For all 3 datasets, the baseline accuracy drops
sharply to 0 beyond  = 2/255. At this level, the NVM models are no longer able to recover any
performance. For  = (1,2)/255, we observe that 64x64_100k, the most non-ideal of the 3 models,
offers the highest improvement for all 3 datasets, with absolute increase of 35.34% for CIFAR-10,
22.69% for CIFAR-100, and 9.90% (32.70%) for ImageNet top-1 (top-5) at  = 1/255.
We observe the following trends for all 3 non-adaptive attacks:
• More the attacker relies on estimating the target model for attack generation, greater is the
benefit in robustness. We observed an increase in the absolute improvement from baseline
accuracy as we move from Transfer attacks to Black Box to White Box attacks.
• The resulting accuracy is a combination of two opposing forces. The errors caused by
the non-idealities try to lower the accuracy, while the intrinsic robustness arising from the
same non-idealities lower the effectiveness of the attack and pushes the accuracy higher
than the baseline. For example, for 64x64_300k (NF = 0.07), the MVM operations are
close to ideal computation for the non-adaptive attacks to transfer successfully. Whereas,
the more non-ideal crossbar models, 32x32_100k and 64x64_100k, have greater clean
accuracy degradation due to functional errors, but have higher adversarial accuracy, as the
non-idealities hinder the transfer of the attacks.
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• Overall, the intrinsic robustness of NVM crossbars is often within the ball park of Input BW
Reduction. However, stronger adversarial defenses such as SAP [13] and Random Padding
[34] have performed much better.
(a) (b)
Figure 5: Hardware-in-Loop Adaptive Black Box Attacks (PGD, iter=30) on CIFAR-10/100. Target
NVM model is 64x64_100k, and the attacks are generated using 3 different NVM models.
Table 5: Hardware-in-Loop Adaptive White Box Attacks (PGD, =1/255, iter=30)
NVM Crossbar Model (Target)
Dataset (Attack ) Baseline 64×64_300k 32×32_100k 64×64_100k
Attacker’s NVM Crossbar model: 64×64_100k
CIFAR-10 19.64 43.45 (+23.81) 31.78 (+12.14) 28.84 (+9.2)
CIFAR-100 5.78 28.21 (+22.43) 10.86 (+5.08) 9.73 (+3.95)
ImageNet Top-1 0.40 – – 0.80 (+0.40)
ImageNet Top-5 18.60 – – 20.70 (+2.10)
4.2 Hardware-in-Loop Adaptive Attacks
Black Box Attacks When the attacker builds their synthetic dataset by querying the NVM crossbar
hardware implementation of the DNN, the resulting ensemble Black Box attacks are much more
effective. The adversarial accuracy of the hardware falls significantly below the baseline, as shown
in Fig. 5. Even when the attack is built using a crossbar model different from the target, accuracy
degradation is significant. We observe that attacks generated using 32x32_100k (NF = 0.14) are
stronger than those generated using 64x64_300k (NF = 0.07) when applied to 64x64_100k (NF=
0.26). This implies that the lesser the difference in NF, the more effective are the attacks.
White Box Attacks The results for hardware in loop White Box attacks are presented in Table
5. The values in bold indicate that attacker’s NVM crossbar model is an exact match to the target
model’s underlying hardware. Even when the attacker has full knowledge of the hardware, the
non-idealities help improve robustness. We observe that if the attacker’s NVM model is different
from the target, the attacks do not transfer well and are weaker than non-adaptive attacks. For
example, for CIFAR-10, under attack epsilon  = 1/255, the accuracy of 64x64_300k NVM model
is 0.60% for a non-adaptive attack, but 43.45% for an adaptive attack with incorrect NVM model.
Thus having an incorrect crossbar model is worse than having no model at all in this case.
5 Discussion
Non-idealities in NVM crossbars have been a long-standing challenge [8] affecting the feasibility
of analog computing hardware, and several techniques have been proposed to compensate for it
[9]. In this work, we study these non-idealities from the new perspective of adversarial robustness.
We observed that DNNs implemented on an NVM crossbar hardware exhibit increased adversarial
robustness under varied threat models. While this robustness falls short of other defenses [16, 13, 34],
an important point to note is that such robustness is intrinsic to the NVM crossbar hardware, unlike
other defenses which have a computational overhead. Also, any algorithmic defense can be further
implemented on the analog hardware for additional robustness. The non-ideality factor (NF) of the
crossbar model determines the degree of robustness, therefore, one can potentially design NVM
crossbars with optimal trade-off between accuracy degradation and increased robustness due to non-
idealilties. We have demonstrated "Hardware-in-Loop" attacks where the knowledge of underlying
hardware helps generate stronger attacks. While we have considered NVM crossbar models based
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on RRAM technology [32], analog hardware based on other technologies [33, 14] are also possible.
This, along with chip to chip variations, may further hinder the transferability of attacks generated
on one analog computing hardware to another. In summary, this work is the first step toward
understanding the role of non-idealities in NVM crossbar hardware for adversarial robustness. It
opens the possibilities of defenses that leverage the non-ideal computations, and on the other hand,
attacks that exploit these non-idealities.
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increasing the outreach of such technological advancements. In recent years, adversarial attacks have
exposed the inherent vulnerabilities of deep learning based models and have raised questions about
their reliability, especially in mission-critical applications. On the other hand, as deep learning models
are scaled to tackle increasingly complex challenges, their computational needs also continue to grow.
In such a scenario, a low cost hardware, that is fast, reliable and secure, can support widespread
adoption of DL based solutions. In this work, we study how the intrinsic properties of such a low cost
hardware contribute to the adversarial robustness of DL models. One can possibly design secure and
low cost AI systems of the future by leveraging the interplay between the hardware and algorithm, as
demonstrated in this work.
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